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LA RUSSA'S LOOPHOLE: TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
LAWSUITS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS
I. INTRODUCTION
The St. Louis Cardinals are no strangers to tragedy and embar-
rassing media coverage.1 In 2002, the team suffered a terrible loss
when Darryl Kile, "a former 20-game winner and one of the most
respected players in the St. Louis clubhouse," was found dead in his
hotel room. 2 Just five years later, in April 2007, the sudden death of
former Cardinals' relief pitcher Josh Hancock followed. 3 Finally, in
March 2007, the St. Louis Cardinals faced embarrassment when
team manager Tony La Russa was "found sleeping behind the
wheel of a sports utility vehicle during spring training with a blood
alcohol level of 0.093 percent."4 These events were rehashed in
2009, when Tony La Russa's name was "twitterjacked." 5 Thereafter,
on May 6, 2009, Tony La Russa filed suit against the social network-
ing site Twitter, claiming various injuries resulting from the
"twitterjacking. ' '6
1. See generally Stephen Cannella, Kile Found Dead in Chicago Hotel Room,
CNNSI.coM, June 22, 2002, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/news/
2002/06/22/cards.kile-ap (describing circumstances of Kile's death); see also NBC
Sports, Lawyer Denies Twitter "Payoff' to La Russa, http://nbcspors.msnbc.com/id/
31780329 (last visited March 22, 2010) [hereinafter "NBC Report"] (reporting
death of Cardinals' pitchers Darryl Kile and Josh Hancock).
2. Cannella, supra note 1 ("Cardinals pitcher Darryl Kile died of a heart con-
dition in his Chicago hotel room in 2002.").
3. See NBC Report, supra note 1 ("Cardinals reliever Josh Hancock died in an
auto accident in April 2007, and the medical examiner measured his blood-alcohol
level at 0.157 - nearly twice the legal limit.").
4. Id.
5. See generally Douglas MacMillan, La Russa vs. Twitter Tests Web Anonymity,
BUS.WEEK, June 10, 2009, available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/
content/jun2009/tc2009069_767898.htm (detailing La Russa lawsuit). Twitter's
policy details the terms of use in regard to impersonation, trademark policy, and
name squatting. See Twitter.com, Impersonation Policy, http://help.twitter.com/
forums/26357/entries/18366 (last visited July 28, 2009) [hereinafter "Impersona-
tion Policy"] (outlining Twitter's impersonation policy). "Twitterjacking" is a term
created to describe instances of identity theft when a user registers using the name
of a celebrity, thus making posts under false pretenses. See William Sloan Coats et
al., Right of Publicity: Who, What, When, Where, Why, and More Importantly, How Much?,
985 PLI/PAT 271, 284 (2009) (discussing impact of new technology of right of
publicity claims).
6. See Complaint for Trademark Infringement, False Designation of Origin,
Trademark Dilution, Cybersquatting, Misappropriation of Name, and Misappro-
priation of Likeness, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. 09-488101 (filed May 06, 2009)
[hereinafter "Complaint"] (alleging harm caused by Twitter against La Russa).
(573)
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Twitter is a free online social network that allows users to post
and read messages, called "tweets."7 Users may make postings
under "any name they wish, real or imagined, so long as they make
it clear if they're impersonating someone."8 In essence, Twitter al-
lows users to answer the simple question, "What are you doing?" in
140 characters or less, and share their answers with others.9 Cre-
ated in 2006, "Twitter has grown into a real-time short messaging
service that works over multiple networks and devices."10 Since its
release, Twitter has risen in the ranks of popular social networks,
rubbing elbows with Facebook and MySpace. 11 Unfortunately for
Twitter, this increasing popularity also produced mounting legal
claims against it.' 2 Although La Russa is the first to file suit against
Twitter based on an instance of "twitterjacking," other popular
figures including the Dalai Lama and Kanye West, have shared simi-
lar experiences.1 3
The complaint contained claims of both tortuous actions and intellectual property
infringements. See id.
7. See Twitter.com, Twitter Support: Frequently Asked Questions, http://
help.twitter.com/forums/1071 I/entries/13920 (last visited Sept. 23, 2009) ("Twit-
ter is a service for friends, family, and co-workers to communicate and stay con-
nected through the exchange of quick, frequent messages. People write short
updates, often called "tweets" of 140 characters or fewer. These messages are
posted to your profile or your blog, sent to your followers, and are searchable on
Twitter search.").
8. MacMillan, supra note 5. Twitter Policy details terms of use in regard to
impersonation, trademark policy, and name squatting. For full text see Imperson-
ation Policy, supra note 5 (detailing Twitter's impersonation policy); Twitter.com,
Trademark Policy, http://help.twitter.com/forums/26257/entries/18367 (last vis-
ited July 28, 2009) [hereinafter "Twitter Trademark Policy"] (detailing Twitter's
trademark policy); Twitter.com, Name Squatting, http://help.twitter.com/fo-
rums/26257/entries/18370 (last visited July 28, 2009) [hereinafter "Twitter Name
Squatting Policy"] (detailing Twitter's Name Squatting Policy).
9. See Jennifer Archie, et al., Protecting Your Rights in 140 Characters or Less:
Trademark Protection on Twitter, 21 No. 11 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 23, 23 (2009)
(describing Twitter).
10. Twitter.com, About Us, http://twitter.com/about#about (last visited Sept.
23, 2009).
11. See Andy Kazeniac, Social Networks: Facebook Takes Over Top Spot, Twitter
Climbs, Feb. 9, 2009, http://blog.compete.com/2009/02/09/facebook-myspace-
twitter-social-network (depicting popularity of Facebook and Twitter).
12. See generally Lori E. Lesser, Social Networks and Blogs, 962 PLI/PAT 23, 28
(2009) ("Despite their success, social networking sites and blogs present new legal
issues as they face challenges from legislators, state attorneys general, users and
content owners over issues including invasion of privacy, copyright and trademark
infringement and defamation.").
13. See MacMillan, supra note 5 (reporting instances of celebrities other than
La Russa who have experienced trouble with Twitter and false accounts). Initially,
Twitter suspended the false Dalai Lama site but it "later reappeared with the name
'the UNOFFICIAL Twitter page of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.'" Id. Further, the
postings set up under the name of Kanye West were removed after Kanye West
complained "on his personal blog about an imposter posing as him, and called
[Vol. 17: p. 573
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The claims addressed in La Russa's suit arose after an anony-
mous user falsely created a Twitter account page under La Russa's
name.1 4 The page contained postings making light of the previ-
ously mentioned tragedies and embarrassments faced by the St.
Louis Cardinals. 15 The complaint emphasizes that:
The Site states in large lettering, 'Tony La Russa is using Twit-
ter,' and encourages users to 'Join today to start receiving Tony La
Russa's updates.' It also contains a picture of Plaintiff with his
name printed next to it. Beneath the picture, the Site contains writ-
ten entries that are impliedly written by Plaintiff himself when in
fact they are not.16
Finally, in the user profile, the false anonymous user noted
that, "Bio Parodies are fun for everyone." 1 7
Twitter 'irresponsible and deceitful' for not doing anything to stop it." Id. Other
"twittejacked" celebrities include "Tina Fey, Christopher Walken, Condoleeza
Rice, and Bill Gates." Coats et al., supra note 5, at 284; see alsoJoshua Rhett Miller,
"Twitterjacking" - Identity Theft in 140 Characters or Less, FOXNEWS.COM, May 1, 2009,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,518480,00.html (providing list of several
celebrity victims of "twittejacking"). In the sports world:
Eagles CB Asante Samuel last month Tweeted a Super Bowl guarantee
that was reported locally, but Samuel "didn't have a Twitter account."
Cowboys DE DeMarcus Ware and Steelers QB Ben Roethlisberger also
supposedly made comments via Twitter despite not having an actual ac-
count. As of Friday, there were "10,848 people 'following' a fake account
under" Colts QB Peyton Manning's name, while "another 17,084 were
following a fake" account under Giants QB Eli Manning's name.
Sports Media, Tony La Russa Settles Lawsuit Against Twitter Out of Court, STREET &
SMITH'S SPORTS BUSINESS D IL, June 8, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.
com/article/130769.
14. See Zusha Elinson, Twitter Says It Will Fight La Russa Suit Over Fake Tweets,
LAw.coM, June 09, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=
1202431321477 (addressing La Russa's issue with Twitter).
15. See id. (describing false La Russa Twitter page). The postings were as
follows:
Lost 2 out of 3, but we made it out of Chicago without one drunk driving incident
or dead pitcher... I'd call that a 1-55 series. 8:01 PM Apr. 19th from web;
Fortunately, Ian Snell sucks now ... when Molina and Duncan Jr. go deep of you
its time to look yourself in the mirror, have an ice... 3:33 PM Apr 8th from web;
Drinking a cold Zima and wishing fucking Hancock was alive, I bet he could've
gotten Jack Wilson out. 4:13 PM Apr 7th from web.
Complaint, supra note 6.
16. William McGeveran, Celebrity Impersonation and Section 230, INFO/LAw,
June 25, 2009, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2009/06/25/impersonation-
and-230 (explaining purpose of complaint's emphasis was due to Tony LaRussa's
likelihood of prevailing on trademark infringement claim depending his ability to
prove the phony account was likely to confuse consumers into believing LaRussa
endorsed Twitter).
17. Id. There were only four followers to the false account, which could have
caused a multitude of problems for La Russa's claims. See id. (detailing underlying
facts of La Russa suit).
2010]
3
Bluestone: La Russa's Loophole: Trademark Infringement Lawsuits and Social N
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
576 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Upset by the page content, La Russa contacted Twitter and
asked that the page be shut down.18 Allegedly, Twitter ignored La
Russa's complaints, and La Russa responded by filing the first ever
legal challenge against the site.19 After the suit was filed, Twitter
removed the case to federal court, followed by La Russa's motion to
dismiss the suit with prejudice in June 2009.20
Despite its dismissal, the La Russa suit is unique in comparison
to the legal suits endured by social networks in the past.2 1 Most
notably, La Russa's suit not only addresses tort-based legal claims,
but also addresses claims of trademark infringement against a social
network. 22 La Russa filed suit for the following causes of action: (1)
trademark infringement; (2) false designation of origin; (3) trade-
mark dilution; (4) cybersquatting; (5) misappropriation of name;
(6) misappropriation of likeness; (7) invasion of privacy; and, (8)
intentional misrepresentation. 23 Most of La Russa's allegations are
well established in intellectual property and tort law. 24 Cybersquat-
ting, however, is a relatively new concept that is gaining attention as
Internet popularity grows.25
18. See Elinson, supra note 14 (reporting La Russa's actions upon discovery of
false Twitter page).
19. See id. (addressing La Russa using filing suit after notifying Twitter of
fraud without reply).
20. See Notice of Dismissal, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. 09-2503 (filed June
2009). The Dismissal was filed pursuant to rule 41(a) (1) (A) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Id.
21. See McGeveran, supra note 16 (marking La Russa's suit against Twitter as
novel in certain aspects).
22. See id. (noting that complaint makes trademark claims which are not often
used). In general, tort-based claims are a more popular and well established law in
conjunction with social network liability, whereas, claims pertaining to trademark
infringement are a more rare and less explored area of law when against social
networks. See id. (describing popularity of tort-based claims against social networks
as opposed to trademark infringement claims).
23. See Complaint, supra note 6 (listing La Russa's claims against Twitter).
24. See id. (listing allegations). Those claims alleged by La Russa that are well
established law are the claims of trademark infringement and dilution, misappro-
priation of name and likeness, invasion of privacy, and intentional misrepresenta-
tion. Steven Seidenberg, Names' Sake; Social Media Pose Trademark Threats for
Companies, INSIDE COUNCIL, Sept. 1, 2009 at 24, available at http://www.insidecoun-
sel.com/Issues/2009/September%202009/Pages/Names-Sake.aspx.
25. See Seidenberg, supra note 24 ("There are clear rules and legal procedures
for resolving cybersquatting and other domain name disputes, but the law hasn't
yet caught up to social media."); see also Peter S. Sloane & LauraJ. Winston, Trade-
marks and Copyrights as Growth Opportunities Even in a Recessionary Economy, INT'L
PROP. TODAY, May 2009, at 30, available at http://www.leasonellis.com/
TheBusiness of Trademarks.andCopyrights.pdf.pdf ("A record 2,156 com-
plaints alleging cybersquatting were filed with the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization, representing an 18% increase over 2006 and a 48% increase over
2005.").
[Vol. 17: p. 573
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In the following sections, this Comment provides an overview
of the laws governing many popular claims against social networks
with a strong focus on the claims raised by La Russa. In Section II,
this Comment addresses background issues surrounding La Russa's
claims. 26 The background includes, not only the laws pertaining to
his case, but also methods adopted by social networks, dealing with
similar issues.27 In Section III, this Comment analyzes several legal
issues affecting La Russa's case.28 Finally, Section IV addresses the
possible impact claims similar to La Russa's suit may have on the
legal treatment of social networks in the future.29
II. BACKGROUND
Typically, in lawsuits against Internet service providers, the
general issues that arise include tort claims and intellectual prop-
erty violations.30 Congress has addressed many of these legal issues
by passing the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), and the Anticybersquatting
Protection Act ("ACPA").31 Courts have carefully interpreted most
provisions of the CDA and DMCA.3 2 The ACPA, however, has few
26. For a background of LaRussa's claims, see infra text and accompanying
notes 30-142.
27. For discussion of social networks and the law, see infra text and accompa-
nying notes 30-142.
28. For an analysis of the legal issues, see infra text and accompanying notes
143-221.
29. For a conclusion of the comment, see infra text and accompanying notes
222-228.
30. See Lesser, supra note 12, at 34 (discussing Communications Decency Act
and Digital Millenium Copyright Act). Most tort claims against social networks
have included defamation allegations. See id. at 38 (considering tort claims against
social networks).
31. See id. (discussing DMCA and CDA as applied to legal issues involving cop-
yright and trademark law); see also Communications Decency Act, 27 U.S.C.
§ 230(b) (2) (1998) [hereinafter "CDA"] (providing provisions of CDA); Digital
Millenium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1999) [hereinafter "DMCA"] (provid-
ing provision of DMCA); Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d) (2006) [hereinafter "APCA"] (providing provisions of ACPA). The
ACPA is also known as the Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act. See id (stating
alternative names of act); see also Allison E. Horton, Beyond Control?: The Rise and
Fall of Defamation Regulation on the Internet, 43 VAL. U. L. REv. 1265, 1305 (2009)
(discussing Congressional intent behind CDA); Eric Goldman, The Law of Social
Networking Sites: A Primer, http://technoogy.findlaw.com/articles/01189/
010830.html (last visited March 22, 2010) (listing cases citing CDA and DMCA);
Hillel I. Parness, Toward "Social Networking Law"?, 1 No. 4 Landslide 13, 13 (March/
April 2009) ("At the dawn of the Internet's popularity, various judicial decisions
regarding property rights and personal liberties in the context of the Internet
caused Congress to adopt certain legislation.").
32. See Lesser, supra note 12, at 29 (discussing court interpretation of CDA
and DMCA).
2010]
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interpretive cases to provide direction in this relatively new area of
law.33 Because ACPA litigation remains unchartered territory,
there is room for creative liability arguments, as was the case in La
Russa v. Twitter.34
A. New Issues Originating With Growing Popularity of Internet
When drafting the CDA and DMCA, Congress was wary about
the potential effects of extensive government regulation of the in-
ternet.35 As a result, the language of this new legislation encour-
ages self-regulation, as opposed to creating an overbearing
regulatory presence. 36 However, Congress found it extremely diffi-
cult to craft the final bill, because of the extensive differences be-
tween the Internet and traditional media forms.37
First, the costs of using the Internet are significantly lower than
traditional media forms, "such as television, radio, newspapers, and
magazines."38 The Internet's bargain transaction cost of providing
an easy "way for a speaker to reach a large audience," makes the
Internet an attractive option to network, and advertize. 39 As such,
"unlike traditional media, the barriers to entry as a speaker on the
Internet do not differ significantly from the barriers to entry as a
listener."40 Second, the Internet's youth leaves legality of many
33. See generally ACPA, supra note 31, at § 1125(d) (enumerating statutory re-
quirements bounding anticybersquatting law and year of effectiveness).
34. For full discussion of this law, see infra text accompanying notes 202-209.
35. See Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Congress rec-
ognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech . . . [and]
Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet com-
munication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a
minimum."); see CDA, supra note 31, § 230(b) (2) ("It is the policy of the United
States... to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or
Sate regulation."); Zeran, supra at 330-31 ("Congress made a policy choice, how-
ever, not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing
tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially
injurious messages.").
36. See Horton, supra note 31, at 1305 ("The CDA's purpose is to promote
self-help on the Internet and prevent the potential chilling effect that regulation
may have on Internet speech."); see also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52
(D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Congress has conferred immunity from tort liability as an incen-
tive to Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other
offensive material, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even
attempted.").
37. See Blumenthal, supra note 36, at 52 (comparing differences between
traditional media, including print, television and radio broadcasts, and the
internet).
38. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
39. Id.
40. Id.
[Vol. 17: p. 573
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questionable e-activities either unexplored or explored and unavaila-
ble to the public. 41 In turn, this causes confusion among web users
about the legality of their actions. 42 Third, because domain names
are unique to Internet media, they are a more limited resource in
contrast to "visual and verbal trademarks. '43 Finally, unlike tradi-
tional media that seeks out the population to maintain sales and
ratings, an Internet user "has to seek out information through a
time-consuming process of typing and clicking... to enjoy the ben-
efits of cyberspace communication. ' 44 Congress created both the
CDA and DMCA with these factors in mind. 45
B. Communications Decency Act of 1996
Section 230 of the CDA was Congress' reaction to a 1995 case,
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.46 Stratton concerned Prod-
igy Services Company, an Internet service that allows others to post
messages on its site. 47 The court reasoned that because Prodigy vol-
untarily removed several "offensive" postings from its site, it was lia-
ble for any "defamatory messages that it failed to delete. ' 48 The
41. SeeJon H. Oram, Will the Real Candidate Please Stand Up?: Political Parody on
the Internet, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 467, 522 (1998) (speaking to novelty of Internet
and lack of legal precedent concerning conduct on Internet sites).
42. See id. (explaining legal ambiguity with respect to Internet conduct, and
restricted behavior is attributed to Internet law's infancy).
43. Id.
44. Id. Arguably, however, the time consumption of Internet searches has de-
creased due to growing user familiarity with and the proficiency of search engines,
which do most of the legwork for the user. See, e.g., Internet World State, North
America Internet Usage Statistics, Population and Telecommunications Reports,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/statsl4.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2009) (re-
porting 73.9% of Americans uses internet, with 138.7% growth from 2000-2009);
see also SearchEngineWatch.com, Survey: Searchers are Confident, Satisfied &
Clueless - Search Engine Watch (SEW), http://searchenginewatch.com/3462911
(Last visited Sept. 23, 2009) (providing statistics of American trend in internet
searches, including, "87% of online searchers say they have successful search ex-
periences most of the time, including 17% of users who say they always find the
time, including 17% of users who say they always find the information for which
they are looking").
45. For full discussion of CDA and DMCA, see infra notes 46-83.
46. See Lesser, supra note 12, at 34 (discussing history of CDA and cases lead-
ing up to its enactment); Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL
32371 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) [hereinafter "Stratton Oakmont") (providing
backdrop of CDA enactment); CDA, supra note 31, at § 230(c). Note that Con-
gress chose to title this section that provides broadened protection to Internet
network providers, "Protection for 'Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of
offensive material." Lesser, supra note 11, at 34.
47. See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710 (1995) (detailing facts of case).
48. Lesser, supra note 12, at 34. The court held that Prodigy employed an
editorial function when it removed the postings, and was, therefore, treated as a
2010]
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holding in Stratton did not sit well with lawmakers. 49 Based on the
Stratton ruling, companies that are less socially responsible would
escape liability.50 Therefore, Congress enacted Section 230 of the
CDA, which applies to all Internet publishers or speakers.51 It states
that, " [n] o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider." 52 In other words, an In-
ternet service provider, like Prodigy, is not liable for tort or state
based claims because it employs an editorial function.53 Although
Prodigy would have been free from liability, Section 230 does not
afford the original posters of the defamatory material the same lux-
ury of immunity (if the true identity of those posters is
discoverable) 54
Section 230 is not all encompassing, however, and there is a
limit to the shelter created.55 It exempts federal criminal liability,
intellectual property law, and any state laws that are "consistent with
this section" from coverage under the section. 56 Therefore, this
limitation provides a loophole for "celebrities who can recast pri-
vacy-like claims under trademark law (and possibly also rights of
publicity, if those are interpreted as intellectual property under the
language of Section 230(d)). ' '5 7
C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")
Section 512 of the DMCA offers Internet service providers with
a "safe harbor" from monetary damages for claims of copyright in-
fringement, an area otherwise left vulnerable under Section 230 of
publisher of a newspaper. See id. (describing rationale for holding internet service
liable).
49. See id. at 35 (discussing rationale for creating Section 230 of CDA after
Stratton).
50. See id. (highlighting problems with Stratton holding).
51. See id. (noting protection provided by CDA to Internet service providers).
52. CDA, supra note 31, at § 230(c) (1).
53. See Anne H. Hocking, Selected Liability Issues - Social Networks and Blogs, 947
PLI/PAT 187, 197 (2008) (discussing immunities provided to internet service prov-
iders). This includes editing out material that may technically be constitutionally
protected. See id. (detailing immunities provided to internet services providers).
54. See Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) ("None of this
means, of course, that the original culpable party who posts defamatory messages
would escape accountability.").
55. See CDA, supra note 31, at § 230(d) (enumerating limits to Section 230
shelter).
56. Id.
57. McGeveran, supra note 16.
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the CDA.58 Section 512 "immunizes [Internet service providers, in
general,] from liability for contributory or vicarious copyright liabil-
ity for infringing third-party content under a defined set of safe
harbors."59 Nevertheless, if social networking sites or blogs actively
maintain their networks rather than acting merely as passive net-
works, the provider "could be found liable for contributory, vicari-
ous, or inducement of copyright infringement committed by users
on their websites." 60 Therefore, Section 512 protects Internet ser-
vice providers from "liability for infringing material appearing on
their systems" only under certain circumstances. 6 1 To qualify for
the safe harbor, a service provider must:
(a) [Adopt] and reasonably [implement], and [inform]
subscribers and account holders of the service provider's
system or network of, a policy that provides for termina-
tion in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and ac-
count holders of the service provider's system or network
who are repeat infringers; and (b) [accommodate] and []
not interfere with standard technical measures. 62
The DMCA, however, does not require that Internet service
providers follow these guidelines stringently, only that they act rea-
sonably.63 Although the policy requirements are relatively flexible,
the "safe harbor" provided to an Internet service provider does
have limitations.6 4 Under Section 512(c) (1) (A) (iii), the "safe har-
bor" may be limited if the network "upon obtaining.., knowledge
or awareness [of infringing activity, does not act] expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to the material."65 Therefore, an Internet
service provider may only enjoy the "safe harbor" provided by the
58. See Jeffrey D. Neuburger, Technology, the Internet and Electronic Commerce:
Staying Interactive in the High-Tech Environment, A Summary of Recent Developments in
the Law, 927 PLI/PAT 699, 729 (2008) (discussing DMCA safe harbor provisions).
The safe harbor is included in Section 512(c) of the DMCA. Id.
59. Lesser, supra note 12, at 51.
60. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). The active maintenance mentioned can take
a variety of forms including editorial functions. Id.
61. Neuburger, supra note 58, at 729.
62. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A)-(B).
63. See To Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1144
(N.D. Cal. 2008) ("'[T]he mere fact that [the repeat infringer] appeared on [the
internet service provider site] under a different user name and identity does not,
by itself create a legitimate question of fact regarding the procedural implementa-
tion of [that internet service provider's] policy'" (quoting Corbis Corp. v. Ama-
zon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104 (W.D. Wash. 2004))). For a list of cases
analyzing DMCA guidelines, see infra note 73.
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)-(C) (listing limitations on safe harbor).
65. Id. § 512(c) (1)(A) (iii).
2010]
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DMCA so long as the provider advertises a policy against copyright
infringements and makes a realistic threat of shutting down ac-
count access to those who go against the policy. 66
D. Federal Court Interpretations of the CDA and DMCA
After the enactment of the CDA and DMCA, courts began in-
terpreting the legislative language in an ever-expanding number of
cases. 67 In 1997, Zeran v. America Online, tested the immunity pro-
vided to a service provider via Section 230 of the CDA.68 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that Congress had the following rationale
when drafting Section 230;
It would be impossible for service providers to screen each
of their millions of postings for possible problems. Faced
with potential liability for each message republished by
their services, interactive computer service providers
might choose to severely restrict the number and type of
messages posted.69
Therefore, the court determined that creating liability upon
notice would have "a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet
speech." 70
In 1998, the D.C. Circuit expanded on the immunities de-
scribed in Zeran when deciding Blumenthal v. Drudge.7 1 Despite
America Online's (AOL) showing that the individual making de-
famatory posts was on its payroll to make the postings, the court
determined that AOL retained its immunity as an Internet service
provider. 72 In the following years, several cases cited Zeran as au-
66. See Lesser, supra note 12, at 55-56 (discussing DMCA safe harbor).
67. See id. at 56 (listing cases citing CDA and DMCA).
68. See Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing
proper use of CDA in holding).
69. Id. at 331.
70. Id. at 333.
Because service providers would be subject to liability only for the publi-
cation of information, and not for its removal, they would have a natural
incentive simply to remove messages upon notification, whether the con-
tents were defamatory or not ... Thus, like strict liability, liability upon
notice has a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech.
Id. (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986)).
71. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52-3 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Zeran, 129
F.3d 327; see also Horton, supra note 31, at 1287-88 (2009) (discussing holding in
Blumenthal).
72. See Blumentha4 992 F. Supp. at 52-53 ("While it appears to this Court that
AOL in this case has taken advantage of all the benefits conferred by Congress in
the [CDA], and then some, without accepting any of the burdens that Congress
10
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thority, thus reaffirming the Zeran court's findings. 73 Finally, in
2001, the Southern District of New York affirmed that the CDA
does not provide immunity to Internet service providers from trade-
mark infringement claims in Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assoc.
7 4
The affirmation in Gucci gave rise to several cases triggering
the DMCA safe harbors. 75 In 2001, the Central District of Califor-
nia used a textualist interpretation method of the DMCA to deter-
mine safe harbor qualifications in Hendrickson v. eBay.76 In doing
so, the court held that a notice of infringement to eBay must "com-
ply substantially" with the direct language of the DMCA to remove
the safe harbor protection. 77 The District of Maryland, in Costar
intended, the statutory language is clear: AOL is immune from suit .... "); see also
Horton, supra note 31, at 1287-88 (explaining Blumenthal ruling).
73. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBiI, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007)
(citing Zeran and holding Google immune from liability); Carafano v. MetroS-
plash.com Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding Matchmaker.com
immune from suit concerning false content in dating profiles); Doe v. MySpace,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 84748 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (citing Zeran and holding MyS-
pace immune from civil liability despite allegedly knowing about postings of child
pornography); Parker v. Google Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(citing Zeran and holding Google immune from liability even after receiving notice
of defamatory material); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090,
1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (quoting Zeran and holding Amazon.com immune from
state law claims despite encouraging vendors to post content and images because
vendors decide what is posted, not Amazon.com); Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51
(quoting Zeran and holding America Online not to be "internet content provider"
despite having editorial function over alleged infringing material); Barrett v. Ro-
senthal, 146 P.3d 510, 529 (Cal. 2006) (holding immunity applies to distributors as
well as publishers).
74. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assoc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law per-
taining to intellectual property.") (quoting CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2) (1998)).
75. See, e.g., Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1111(9th Cir. 2007) ("A service provider
reasonably implements its repeat infringer policy if it terminates users when 'ap-
propriate.' Section 512 (i) itself does not clarify when it is 'appropriate' for service
providers to act. It only requires that a service provider terminate users who are
'repeat infringers."'); lo Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132,
1144 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ("'[T]he mere fact that [the repeat infringer] appeared on
[the internet service provider site] under a different user name and identity does
not, by itself create a legitimate question of fact regarding the procedural imple-
mentation of [that internet service provider's] policy.'"); CoStar Group, Inc. v.
Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 703 (D. Md. 2001) ("This requirement is de-
signed so that flagrant repeat infringers, who 'abuse their access to the Internet
through disrespect for the intellectual property rights of others should know there
is a realistic threat of losing . . .access.'").
76. See Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(discussing safe harbor provision); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (listing require-
ments constituting proper notice).
77. See Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1092-93 (discussing court's rationale
for DMCA provision requirements); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i) (stating
that notification to Internet service providers must "comply substantially" with
listed elements in order to find that provider "has actual knowledge or is aware of
20101 583
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Group v. Loopnet, further expanded on the DMCA interpretations.
78
An Internet service provider's "policy must warn users who repeat-
edly infringe copyrights that there is a 'realistic threat' of losing
account access." 79 Further, the Western District of Washington, in
Corbis v. Amazon.com, held that:
(1) a termination policy need not eliminate all infringers
in order to be 'reasonably implemented'; (2) repeated
'takedown' notices alone are not sufficient to trigger ter-
mination obligation; and (3) implementation details of
the termination policy need not be communicated to
users.
8 0
Finally, in Doe v. MySpace, the Western District of Texas ex-
tended the CDA and DMCA immunities to include social net-
works.81 These cases reflect the changing ways people use and
interact with the Internet.8 2 As these types of changes persist,
courts will continue to test Congressional legislation.
3
E. Cybersquatting
In Tony La Russa's complaint, he raised a cybersquatting
claim; a claim with questionable application to Twitter as a social
network.8 4 Cybersquatting is a civil liability borne by "any person
who registers a domain name that consists of the name of another
living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar
thereto, without the person's consent, with the specific intent to
the facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent"). eBay is an
Internet forum that acts as a "marketplace" for its users to buy and sell products
online. eBay, Who We Are - eBay Inc., http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited
Oct. 17, 2009). The court determined that the plaintiff did not provide proper
notice to eBay because the notice did not substantially comply with the provisions
listed in Section 512 of the DMCA. Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. This
holding provided that, although there is some flexibility in the proper form of
notice, there still must be some conformance with the DMCA's guidelines. Id.
78. See Costar, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 703 (expanding on DMCA requirements).
79. Lesser, supra note 12, at 56 (citing holding in Costar).
80. Id. (citing holding in Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090
(W.D. Wash. 2004)).
81. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 847 (W.D. Tex. 2007)
(holding that social networks were included in immunities provided by Section
230). The court also noted that Section 230 affords immunities to Internet service
providers for claims other than defamation. Id. at 849.
82. See Sloane, supra note 25, at 30 (discussing new issues arising with new
Internet uses).
83. See id. (discussing existence of many new issues yet to arise due to amount
of new litigations pending internationally).
84. See Complaint, supra note 6 (stating that Twitter should be included
within scope of cybersquatting liability).
12
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profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial
gain."8 5 These disputes arise not only because there are a finite
number of domain names, but also because those domain names
are registered on a first come first serve basis.86 Without regulatory
protection, the field would be left open not only to those trying to
capitalize on opportunity but also those innocently registering for
other reasons.8 7 There are many kinds of cybersquatters, all of
whom are liable.88 Therefore, those who feel their rights have been
infringed upon can look to either of two different instruments to
protect those rights.89 These two instruments, established in late
1999, are "the Anticybersquatting Protection Act (ACPA), enacted
by the U.S. Congress... and the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP), adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN)." 9
1. Anticybersquatting Protection Act
An amendment to the Lanham Act, the ACPA imposes civil
liability on those who take part in "act[s] of registering, trafficking
85. Dale M. Cendali & Brendan T. Kehoe, Technology and Entertainment Cover-
gance 2009: Hot Business and Legal Issues in "Technotainment", 978 PLI/PAT 93, 107
(2009) (citing Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)
(2006)). "In essence, domain names are like street addresses for the Internet -
They allow an Internet server to find a particular website." Aura Lichtenberg and
Melissa Solomon, What Social Squatting Means for Trademark Holders: How to Protect
Your Brand On Social Networking Sites, 22 DCBA BRIEF 36, 36-37 (2009). Every do-
main name has two parts, the top-level domain that follows the dot (such as .com
or .org) and the second level domain "which is the name that directly precedes the
dot in every web address." Id. at 37. "Most legal issues arise regarding the second-
level domain because there cannot be two identical second-level domains under
the same top-level domain." Id.
86. See Lichtenberg, supra note 85, at 37 (explaining reasoning for creating
domain name protections).
87. See id. (addressing how domain name disputes arise).
88. See Zohar Efroni, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and the Uni-
form Dispute Resolution Policy; New Opportunities for International Forum Shopping?, 26
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 335, 337-38 (2003) (discussing different types of cybersquat-
ring and instruments usable by those whose rights are infringed).
"Classic" cybersquatters register domain names based on trademarks and try to sell
them to mark owners for profit. By contrast, a second group, "cyberpirates," incor-
porate marks in their domain names to attract traffic and divert users from their
intended destination, making profits from the inadvertent "hits" on their websites
and from advertisements posted on those sites. A third group, "typosquatters," in-
dulge[s] in the activity of registering domain names that incorporate marks in a
few variations (sometimes dozens), including misspelling or incomplete
names ... Finally, there are "pseudo-cybersqatters," passive registrants, who merely
hold domain names without operating websites. They conduct no online activity
using the domain names and do not offer them for sale.
Id. at 337.
89. See id. at 338 (naming two forums available for cybersquatting claims).
90. Id.
2010]
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in or using a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to
a mark or dilutive of a famous mark (with bad faith intent to
profit)."91 The act specifies a non-exhaustive list of factors a court
may use to determine whether there is bad-faith intent to profit.92
Included in that list is (1) "the extent to which the domain name
consists of the legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise
commonly used to identify that person;" (2) "the person's bona fide
noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible under
the domain name;" and, (3) "the extent to which the mark incorpo-
rated in the person's domain name registration is or is not distinc-
tive and famous. . .."93
The ACPA also grants courts authority to provide remedies. 94
These remedies include: "forfeiture, cancellation or transfer of the
disputed domain name, as well as either actual damages, or statu-
tory damages of not less than $1,000 and not greater than $100,000
per domain name."95 The ACPA allows a suit to proceed "in rem"
"against the domain name itself in the district where the domain
name was registered" regardless of the identity or location of the
registrant.96
Relatively new to courts, the ACPA has, thus far, been adopted
with a narrow examination for ACPA liability. 97 Courts have con-
structed three basic questions to determine liability: "(i) is the mark
distinctive or famous; (ii) is the domain name in question identical
or confusingly similar to the mark; and (iii) was there a bad faith
91. Id. at 346; see alsoJeffrey D. Neuburger, New Media, Technology and the Law:
A Summary of Key Legal Developments Affecting Technology and Emerging Business Models,
978 PLI/ PAT 249, 271 (2009) (explaining provisions of ACPA). Under the ACPA,
a famous mark can include some personal names. Id. at 271.
92. See Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d) (1) (B) (listing factors courts may use in analysis); see also Lee Anne Fen-
nell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HAtv. L. Rv. 1403, 1415 (2009) (defining cyber-
squatting and controlling law).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B).
94. See Neuburger, supra note 91, at 271 (discussing remedies provided by
ACPA).
95. Id. at 271.
96. Efroni, supra note 88, at 347; see also Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, 310
F.3d 293, 294 (2d Cir. Nov. 7, 2002) (holding in remjurisdiction of ACPA to apply
only to district in which domain name is registered); Broadbridge Media LLC v.
Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying ACPA's in
rem provisions to hold jurisdiction over cybersquatting case). This gives the ACPA
a further jurisdictional reach than the Lanham Act. See Efroni, supra note 88, at
347.
97. See Efroni, supra note 88, at 347 (discussing court analysis and application
of ACPA).
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intent to profit."98 Finally, trademarks in domain names are used
quite often for purposes of criticism and parody. 99 Courts vary in
their decisions on this type of use. 100
2. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (adopted by
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers)
The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP), adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN), is an instrument that provides remedy to
cybersquatting victims. 10 1 The UDRP is composed of arbitrators
who have the power to provide limited relief by either transferring
the domain name to the complainant, or cancelling the domain
name. 0 2 UDRP's purpose is to determine:
(1) if the disputed domain name is identical or confus-
ingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which a
complainant has rights;
(2) if the registrant has no rights or legitimate interest in
the domain name; and,
(3) if the domain name has been registered and is being
used in bad faith. 103
Therefore, a complainant may attempt, and possibly succeed,
in recovering multiple names in a single action. 10 4 Generally,
UDRP proceedings resemble civil law proceedings. 10 5 They also
98. Id. See, e.g., Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482-86 (3d Cir. 2001) (us-
ing three part test as to whether (1) mark was distinctive or famous, (2) domain
name was identical or confusingly similar to mark, and (3) there was bad faith
intent to profit). For further discussion of case interpretation of ACPA, see supra
note 91 and accompanying text.
99. See Neuburger, supra note 91, at 279 (noting commonness of use of trade-
marks in domain names for purpose of criticism or parody). Many times these
types of sites are called "gripe sites." Id. "Opinions in disputes over these so-called
'gripe sites' under trademark law and the ACPA vary in their results, as do rulings
under the ICANN UDRP." Id.
100. See id. (noting varied court decisions on issues of using trademarks in
domain names in spirit of parody or criticism).
101. See id. at 269-70 (discussing resolution opportunity through UDRP for
victims of cybersquatting).
102. See id. at 269 (noting remedies available in UDRP action).
103. Id. at 270.
104. See Mairead Moore, Cybersquatting: Prevention Better Than Cure?, 17 INT'L
J.L. & INFO. TECH 220, 227 (2009) (noting cost effectiveness of UDRP).
105. See Anne H. Hocking, Basic Principles of Trademark Law, 973 PLI/PAT 83,
117 (2009) ("There is no discovery, no personal appearances or telephone confer-
ences with the adjudicator; everything is done on paper."); see also ICANN, Rules
for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct. 24, 1999), available at
http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm [hereinafter "Rules for
2010]
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move quite quickly, requiring the adjudicator to come to a decision
within three weeks. 10 6 In cases where the complainant prevails, the
remedy will "take place 10 days after the decision is issued unless
the panel is informed by the defendant that they are initiating court
proceedings [via ACPA] on the matter."10 7 Conversely, because
there is no res judicata, in cases where the complainant does not
prevail, a plaintiff can re-file repeatedly with any "domain name dis-
pute provider... until the desired result is reached."108
3. ACPA v. UDRP; Which One Should I Use?
Complainants may file suit under either the ACPA or through
UDRP. 10 9 Thus, a complainant should determine the best forum to
fit a case by weighing the pros and cons of each forum. 110 Once
cybersquatting is apparent, both provide helpful remedies. 11'
The UDRP may prove to be a better forum not only because of
its efficiency and timeliness, but also because of its "user-friendly"
quality. 112 Conversely, the "ACPA is not ideal for solving political-
cybersquatting problems because: (1) litigation is too costly and
slow for most candidates; (2) non-commercial cybersquatters may
not have the requisite 'bad faith intent to profit;' and (3) jurisdic-
tional issues may prevent American courts from reaching foreign
cybersquatters." 11 Further, the UDRP has a "user-friendly" proce-
dure that is "both a quick method of resolving disputes quickly and
UDRP"] (enumerating rules established by ICANN under UDRP to file proceed-
ings against alleged infringers).
106. See Hocking, supra note 105, at 117 (explaining UDRP proceedings).
107. Moore, supra note 104, at 226-27.
108. Hocking, supra note 105, at 117 ("[A]n aggrieved domain name plaintiff
can simply re-file with the same or different domain name dispute provider, such
as the World Intellectual Property Organization or National Arbitration Forum.").
See also ICANN, Approved Providers for Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolu-
tion Policy, http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm (last
visited Sept. 29, 2009) [hereinafter "Approved Providers for UDRP"] (providing
list of approved providers under whom to file for UDRP arbitration).
109. See Lichtenberg, supra note 85, at 41-42 (noting complainant's need to
choose between forums).
110. See id. (mentioning when ACPA works best for complainant).
111. See id. at 41 (stating both ACPA and UDRP provide helpful remedies for
cybersquatting cases).
112. See Matthew T. Sanderson, Candidates, Squatters, and Gripers: A Primer on
Political Cybersquatting and a Proposal for Reform, 8 ELECTION L.J. 3, 14 (2009) (dis-
cussing situations for which filing suit under ACPA may not be ideal and for which
UDRP provides better remedies); see also Moore, supra 104, at 227 (noting positive
qualities of using UDRP arbitration for cybersquatting cases). "In terms of times-
cales, it is possible to finish a regular UDRP case between 47 and 57 days from the
submission of the complaint. The UDRP is also extremely cost effective." Id.
113. Sanderson, supra note 112, at 14.
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also a relatively cheap option."114 Finally, in cases where a com-
plainant "can easily prove the registrant's bad faith registration of a
domain name, then it may be preferable to initiate an ICANN pro-
ceeding under the UDRP."' 1 5
Conversely, filing federal suits under the ACPA may prove ben-
eficial in complicated cases.' 16 "When an issue of contract, free
speech or trademark infringement is involved, in addition to an is-
sue of bad faith registration and use, the better course of action is
to file a federal lawsuit under the ACPA." 1 7 Also, if a complainant
desires monetary damages, as well as equitable relief, the best
choice is to file a lawsuit under the provisions of the ACPA. 118
F. Social Networks' Metamorphosis With the Law
The top social networks adapted to Congressional legislation
to take advantage of liability immunity.'1 9 The two most popular
social networks, Facebook and MySpace, have gone through a series
of changes to avoid liability. 120 Nevertheless, both networks have
found themselves at the center of several lawsuits questioning
whether their policies are enough to remove them from liability. 121
MySpace and Facebook are sites that connect their users by "inte-
grating personal profiles, photos, videos, mobile, messaging, [and]
games."122
114. Moore, supra note 104, at 227.
115. Lichtenberg, supra note 85, at 42.
116. See id. at 41-42 ("[R]ights holders might want to consider bringing claims
under the ACPA when a case requires discovery of complicated facts .... ").
117. Deborah A. Wilcox, What Trademark Owners Need to Know About Domain
Names, 962 PLI/PAT 769, 776 (2009).
118. Compare Neuburger, supra note 91, at 271 (discussing remedies allowed
under ACPA) with Neuburger, supra note 91, at 270 (discussing remedies allowed
under UDRP).
119. For full discussion on social networks that have adapted to the immunity
of the CDA and DMCA through the drafting of their terms of service, see infra text
and accompanying notes 123-129.
120. See Kazeniac, supra note 11 (portraying Facebook and MySpace as hold-
ing top two positions as most popular site measured by visits per month by users);
see also infra text accompanying notes 123-129. MySpace and Facebook are sites
that connect their users by "integrating personal profiles, photos, videos, mobile,
messaging, [and] games." MySpace Press Room: About MySpace , MYSPACE.COM,
http://www.myspace.com/pressroom?url=/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinaf-
ter MySpace Press Release]; see also Press Room: Facebook Factsheet,
FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?factsheet (last visited
Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Facebook/Factsheet] (portraying facts about
Facebook).
121. For full discussion of lawsuits faced by MySpace and Facebook, see infra
text and accompanying notes 123-142.
122. MySpace Press Release, supra note 120 (portraying facts about MySpace);
see also Facebook/Factsheet, supra note 120 (portraying facts about Facebook).
2010] 589
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1. The CDA/DMCA and the Social Network
As previously discussed, the CDA protects social networks from
most state action liability, except some of those pertaining to intel-
lectual property. 123 Furthermore, the DMCA provides additional
protections to social networks qualifying for safe harbor in cases
involving intellectual property infringement. 12 4 In an effort to pro-
tect themselves under the CDA and DMCA safe harbors, both
Facebook and MySpace include language in their terms of service,
which avails themselves to the protections offered by both legisla-
tions. 1 25 First, both sites reserve the right to remove any materials
they see fit for any or no reason. 12 6 Second, both sites reserve the
right to terminate users for any or no reason, specifically in in-
stances of repeat offenses.' 27 Finally, neither site works to "inter-
fere with standard technical measures" and have availed themselves
to specified United States courts.' 28 In this sense, both social net-
works have attempted to maneuver themselves under the shelter of
the law. 129
123. For full discussion on the CDA, see supra text and accompanying notes
46-57.
124. For full discussion on the DMCA and safe harbor requirements, see
supra text and accompanying notes 58-66.
125. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK.COM, Dec. 21, 2009,
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf [hereinafter Facebook TOS] (pro-
viding terms of use that include language reserving rights to remove any content
posted by users, and expressing disapproval of posted materials that infringe
others' rights); see also MySpace.com Terms of User Agreement, MYSPACE.COM,Jun.
25, 2009, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms [hereinafter
MySpace TOS] (detailing prohibited materials that may not be posted, as well as
reserving right to remove information for any or no reason).
126. Compare Facebook TOS, supra note 125 (enumerating terms of service
for Facebook users and rights reserved by network providers) with MySpace TOS,
supra note 125 (addressing terms of service for MySpace users and rights reserved
by network provider).
127. Compare Facebook TOS, supra note 125 (enumerating terms of service
for Facebook users and rights reserved by network providers) with MySpace TOS,
supra note 125 (addressing terms of service for MySpace users and rights reserved
by network provider).
128. DMCA, supra note 31, § 517(i) (B); see also MySpace TOS, supra note 125
("The Agreement shall be governed by . . . the laws of the State of New York,
without regard to its conflict of law provisions. You and MySpace agree to submit
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts located within the State of New York to
resolve any dispute arising out of the Agreement or the MySpace Services.");
Facebook TOS, supra note 125 ("You will resolve any claim, cause of action or
dispute ("claim") you have with us arising out of or relating to this Statement or
Facebook exclusively in a state or federal court located in Santa Clara County.").
129. Compare Facebook TOS, supra note 125 (enumerating terms of service
for Facebook users and rights reserved by network providers) with MySpace TOS,
supra note 125 (addressing terms of service for MySpace users and rights reserved
by network provider).
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2. Cybersquatting and the Social Network
Most cybersquatting cases pertain to top-level domains (i.e.,
".com," ".gov" or ".edu" ) preceded by second level domain
terms. 130 When Facebook released an option to its users to register
usernames, the social network had a brush with cybersquatting-like
issues.' 3 1 The issue involving Facebook is unique, because the
usernames are contained in the post domain path level (after the
".com" in a URL).132 Therefore, the mark allegedly used in in-
fringement is not within the "domain name" as defined by courts
under the ACPA.133 Although the username position, after the
".com," de-classifies the trademarks from being within a "domain
name" as defined by the courts under the ACPA and UDRP, the
issues involved are remarkably similar.1 34
Facebook anticipated a problem of bad faith registration, and
created a policy stating "the chosen username should be as close as
possible to the user's true name, and 'must adhere to Facebook's
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities.' [Further,] [b]efore
launch of the registration, Facebook allowed users who own regis-
tered trademarks to register them with Facebook" prior to the re-
mainder of the Facebook user population, "so that their trademarks
would not be included in the vanity URLs open for registration."' 35
If a registered trademark owner did not register in time, Facebook
130. See Peter T. Wakiyama & Odia Kagan, Facebook Vanity URLs May Hurt More
Than Just One's Pride, 21 No. 9 INTELL. PRop. & TECH. L.J. 7, 8 (2009) (citation
omitted) (discussing typical cybersquatting cases). Lawsuits for trademark in-
fringement generally arise when the second level domain terms contain a pro-
tected mark without the holder's consent or knowledge, and the use of the mark is
in bad-faith. See id. (presenting typical elements of trademark infringement
lawsuits).
131. See id. (discussing claims against Facebook after issuing user names). For
further discussion on post-domain paths, see infra text and accompanying notes
138-142. The user names can only be used once, and come after the ".com" in the
Facebook address (i.e. www.facebook.com/jdoe) and have been donned as "vanity
URLs". Wakiyama, supra note 130, at 7 ("On June 13, 2009, Facebook vanity URds
opened for registration by its users. Instead of www.facebook.com/id=591932074,
a user's page would now be located at www.facebook.com/johndoe, allowing the
user to be easily found by entering his or her name into the URL in the browser.").
"Examples of the new pages can be seen at www.facebook.com/cocacola,
www.facebook.com/gap, and www.facebook.com/mcdonalds. Within the first
three minutes of the availability of the Facebook vanity URLs, 200,000 URLs were
registered; within 15 minutes, more than half a million had registered." Id.
132. See id. (discussing position of usernames in post domain path).
133. See id. at 8 (describing court definition of domain names). Note that the
ACPA does not actually provide a definition for a domain name within its text.
ACPA, supra note 31.
134. See Wakiyama, supra note 130, at 8 (describing post-domain paths and
similarity to other cybersquatting issues).
135. Id.
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has incorporated a remedy within its terms of service (TOS).136 To-
day, it is unclear as to whether a trademark holder would prevail in
either an ACPA or UDRP action citing cybersquatting as a cause of
action against a social network for a trademark included in a post-
domain path.' 37
Before the boom of social networks, one particular case may
shed some light on a court's outcome today, if followed.1 38 In Inter-
active Products Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., the Sixth Cir-
cuit determined that a similar or same "post-domain path" of a URL
does not rise to the level of causing a "likelihood of confusion," and
therefore, is not trademark infringement.139 The court based its
holding on the rationale that the "post-domain path of a URL...
does not typically signify source [of goods or services]. The post-
domain path merely shows how the website's data is organized
within the host computer's files." 140 With new developments in the
use of post-domain name paths, especially in cases of social net-
works like Facebook and Twitter, courts may take a different ap-
proach to the situation and find added protections necessary. 141 In
136. See id. ("The first stop in an aggrieved trademark owner's road to recov-
ery for the misappropriation of his or her trademark would be the Facebook terms
of service (TOS), which govern users' activities on the Facebook site."). The TOS
states, "[i]f you select a username for your account we reserve the right to remove
or reclaim it if we believe appropriate (such as when a trademark owner complains
about a username that does not closely relate to a user's actual name)." Facebook
TOS, supra note 125.
137. See Wakiyama, supra note 130, at 7 (posing questions about viability of
case for cybersquatting under ACPA or UDRP).
138. See Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d
687, 696-98 (6th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Interactive] (holding that post-domain
paths do not constitute same thing as domain names as defined by ACPA).
139. See id. at 698 (holding that typically similar post-domain paths will not
rise to level of trademark infringement).
140. Id. at 696-97. Notably, the plaintiff in this case "did not present any evi-
dence that the presence of its trademark in the post-domain path caused actual
confusion or was likely to cause consumer confusion." Enrico Schaefer, The A CPA:
Trademark Violations in Domains, May 17, 2007, http://www.articlesbase.com/intel-
lectual-property-articles/the-acpa-trademark-violations-in-domains-149148.html.
Arguably, presenting this type of evidence may have caused the court to hold dif-
ferently. See id. ("If such evidence existed and was presented, the outcome could
have been different.").
141. See Cendali, supra note 85, at 113 ("[T]he new significance of post-do-
main name paths may cause courts to see the situation differently."). Notably, a
court may determine that the post-domain paths now signify a source when pre-
ceded by a social network second legal domain. See id. (discussing ramifications of
new level of importance placed on post-domain name paths). The username
within a post-domain path could be shown to signal the owner of an accounts
page, therefore leading an Internet user to have a higher likelihood for confusion.
Id.; see also Schaefer, supra note 140 (stating that stronger showing of likelihood of
confusion may have caused court to have different conclusion).
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any event, some argue the best protection for a trademark owner is
to remain pro-active by checking trademark use on the Internet,
and personally registering on social networks to stop the problem
before it starts. 1
4 2
III. ANALYSIS
Despite Tony La Russa dropping his suit, he raised several in-
teresting and creative claims against Twitter. 143 Although few will
argue that La Russa had a strong case, the issues presented have the
potential to become a pressing concern in the near future.14 4 Fur-
ther, Twitter's attempt to modify its self-regulation policy may help
it to dodge a similar lawsuit, or at least give it the upper hand. 45
A. Tweet, a Squawk, or a Whiff (La Russa v. Twitter, Inc.)
In the first ever lawsuit against Twitter, La Russa raised a variety
of claims. 146 His claims contained both tortuous and intellectual
property claims.' 47 La Russa's complaint contained eight causes of
action, including: (1) Trademark Infringement; (2) False Designa-
tion of Origin; (3) Trademark Dilution; (4) Cybersquatting; (5)
Misappropriation of Name; (6) Misappropriation of Likeness; (7)
Invasion of Privacy; and, (8) Intentional Misrepresentation. 148
1. Trick or Tweet (Claims for Misappropriation of Name and Likeness,
Invasion of Privacy, and Intentional Misrepresentation)
First, La Russa raised a tortuous claim for misappropriation of
name or likeness. 149 In most states, a plaintiff must establish three
142. See Moore, supra note 104, at 228 ("[I] t has been suggested by many, that
the solution lies not in [the] reactive stage, but should be pro-active in the sense
that it can be prevented at the earlier registration stage."). There are some sites
that allow individuals to check their trademarks at several social networking sites in
one fell swoop. See, e.g., Namechk.com, Check Username Availability at Multiple
Social Networking Sites, http://namechk.com/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2009)
("Check to see if your desired username or vanity URL is still available at dozens of
popular Social Networking and Social Bookmarking websites.").
143. See McGeveran, supra note 16 (discussing eccentricity of La Russa's claim
against Twitter).
144. See id. (noting weaknesses of La Russa's case against Twitter).
145. See id. (commenting on Twitter's attempt to sell verified accounts to
celebrities).
146. See Complaint, supra note 6 (listing La Russa's claims in lawsuit); see also
Elinson, supra note 14 ("La Russa's suit is the first of its kind against Twitter.").
147. See Complaint, supra note 6 (listing La Russa's claims against Twitter).
148. See id. (enumerating La Russa's claims in lawsuit).
149. See id. (listing La Russa's claims for misappropriation of name or
likeness).
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elements to prevail in this cause of action. 150 The elements are (a)
use of a protected attribute, (b) for an exploitive purpose, and (c)
without consent.151 To establish the use of a protected attribute, a
plaintiff may show that the offending party used "an aspect of his or
her identity that is protected by the law. This ordinarily means a
plaintiffs name or likeness, but the law protects certain other per-
sonal attributes as well. 1 5 2 Next, to establish that the defendant
unlawfully used a protected mark, most states require the plaintiff
to show that the defendant used the attribute for the defendant's
own benefit.153 Furthermore, " [c] onsent is a complete defense to a
legal claim for misappropriation of name or likeness."'154 In his
case, La Russa claimed that by using his name and image on the
false account page, Twitter misappropriated his name and likeness,
as well as projected the illusion of his endorsement.1 55
150. See Citizen Media Law Project, Using the Name or Likeness of Another,
http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/using-name-or-likeness-another (last vis-
ited Oct. 19, 2009) (discussing three factors necessary for plaintiff to show when
raising claim for misappropriation of name or likeness).
151. See id. (noting that name used does not need to be complainant's "full or
formal name, just something that is sufficient to identify" complainant). Further,
"'[I]ikeness' refers to a visual image" of the complainant. Id. This may take any of
a variety of forms, which do not need to "precisely reproduce the [complainant's]
appearance... so long as it is enough to evoke the [complainant's] identity in the
eyes of the public." Id.
152. Id.; see, e.g., Carson v. Here's Jonny Portable Toilets, Inc. 698 F.2d 831
(6th Cir. 1983) (holding that use of "Here's Johnny" slogan within brand name
was sufficient to suggest Johnny Carson's identity); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reyn-
olds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding defendant liable for using
photograph of plaintiffs race car in commercial); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am.,
Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding defendant liable for using robot re-
sembling Vanna White in television commercial).
153. See Citizen Media Law Project, supra note 150 (discussing that individual
can be held liable for using plaintiff's name or likeness for own benefit). A defen-
dant may also be found liable "for some non-commercial uses of someone's name
or likeness if [the defendant] exploit[s] the plaintiffs identity for [the defen-
dant's] own benefit." Id.; see, e.g., Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d
1238 (D. Minn. 2005) (holding anti-abortionist activists liable for registering do-
main names containing names or nicknames of rivals because registration was for
own benefit); Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 600 (Ind. 2001) (hold-
ing professor liable when he used colleagues' names in non-commercial websites
and email accounts to elicit viewers back to own website and it was therefore misap-
propriation which "enabled him to pursue a personal vendetta"); McMann v. Doe,
460 F. Supp. 2d 259 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding defendant not liable for posting
photograph of real estate on "gripe site"). For a further definition of "gripe sites,"
see supra note 99.
154. Citizen Media Law Project, supra note 150.
155. See Complaint, supra note 6 (listing La Russa's allegations against Twitter
in misappropriation claim).
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Second, La Russa raised an invasion of privacy claim. 15 6 His
complaint contained language set out in the California Civil Code
generally used at common law for right of publicity claims.1 57 Sec-
tion 3344 of the California Civil Code provides that "anyone who
knowingly uses another's name, signature, photograph or likeness,
in any manner, for the purpose of advertising or selling or soliciting
without such person's prior consent shall be liable for any damages
sustained. '" 158 Accordingly, La Russa argued that Twitter "ha[d]
made an unauthorized use of his name, signature, photograph and
likeness, in a manner to which he has not consented" and as a re-
sult, La Russa "ha[d] suffered emotional distress, damage to his
reputation and general damages in the sum to be shown according
to proof."
15 9
Third, La Russa claimed intentional misrepresentation. 160
This type of claim is "'usually a fact-intensive inquiry and requires
that the plaintiff allege reliance upon the misrepresentation.' ''161
In his complaint, La Russa alleged that, by publishing "Tony La
Russa is using Twitter," the representation was false and was made
available "to all members of the public over the internet.1 1 62 La
Russa, therefore, concluded that he suffered "significant emotional
distress and damage to his reputation."1 63
Although a complaint is not complete without raising every ele-
ment, current law has well established that Internet service provid-
ers, especially those in Twitter's position as an intermediary, have
156. See id. (listing invasion of privacy as one claim against Twitter).
157. See Russell J. Frackman & Tammy C. Bloomfield, The Right of Publicity:
Going to the Dogs, UCLA ONLINE INST. FOR CYBERSPACE LAW AND POL'Y (Sept.
1996), available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/rftb.html ("In California, the
right of publicity is protected both by statute for 'name, voice, signature, photo-
graph or likeness' (Civil Code § 3344) and, more generally, at common law.").
158. Complaint, supra note 6; see CAL. Civ. CODE. § 3344 (West 2009). Also,
note that in Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., Section 3344 of the California Civil
Code is limited on preemption grounds. 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006). In this
case, the court found that the plaintiffs claim was too similar to a copyright claim,
covered by federal law. See generally id. Therefore, the court determined that fed-
eral law, the Copyright Act, preempted the plaintiffs state claim under Section
3344. See id. at 1141 ("[F]ederal copyright law preempts a claim alleging misappro-
priation of one's voice when the entirety of the allegedly misappropriated vocal
performance is contained within a copyrighted medium.").
159. Complaint, supra note 6.
160. See id. (listing intentional misrepresentation as claim against Twitter).
161. Matthew Walker, Low-Fat Foods or Big Fat Lies?: The Role of Deceptive Market-
ing in Obesity Lawsuits, 22 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 689, 696 (2006) (citation omitted).
162. Complaint, supra note 6.
163. Id.
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been granted wide latitude to qualify for immunity. 1 64 Twitter's
policies and interaction with the site place it within the safe harbors
provided by Section 230 of the CDA.' 65 La Russa's claims for inva-
sion of privacy, however, may have been meant to be right of pub-
licity claims under Section 3344 of the California Civil Code. 166 If
La Russa's invasion of privacy claim is construed as a right to public-
ity claim, courts have held that social networks are not afforded Sec-
tion 230 immunities. 167 In a right of publicity claim, the plaintiff
must show that the network provider unlawfully used a person's
name or likeness for commercial benefit.168 Therefore, assuming
that his claim is construed in this nature by the court, La Russa's
164. See Venkat Balasubramani, Tony La Russa's Legal Claims Against Twitter
Look Tenuous, CIRCLEID,June 09, 2009, http://www.circleid.com/posts/20090609_
tony-la-russas-against twitter_tenuous (discussing weaknesses and points of inter-
est raised by La Russa's suit against Twitter).
165. See id. (addressing broad grant of immunity to internet service providers
acting as intermediaries). For full discussion on immunity granted to service prov-
iders by Congressional legislations, see supra text and accompanying notes 46-57.
166. For full discussion on California common law use of Section 3344, see
supra text and accompanying note 157-158. Further, there are sections in the Cali-
fornia Civil Code illustrating physical and constructive invasion of privacy provi-
sions, not cited in La Russa's complaint. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1708.8(a)-(b)
(Deering 2009). The constructive invasion of privacy provision follows:
A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the defendant
attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person,
any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of
the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity under circum-
stances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy,
through the use of a visual or auditory enhancing device, regardless of
whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, sound recording, or
other physical impression could not have been achieved without a tres-
pass unless the visual or auditory enhancing device was used.
Id. § 1708.8(b).
167. See Citizen Media Law Project, supra note 150 (discussing proceedings in
Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H 2008)). In Doe v.
Friendfinder Network, Inc., the court "held that CDA [Section] 230, which immunizes
website operators from many state law legal claims based on user-generated con-
tent, does not apply to right of publicity claims. Therefore, [Plaintiff's] claim
against the social networking site could go forward, despite the fact that a third-
party created the profile." Id. (citation omitted). Further, the "[r] ight of publicity
protection may cover the use of any personal element that allows the public to
identify the individual." Coats, supra note 5, at 275. The extent that a court will
allow protection to individuals, however, varies from state to state. See id. (discuss-
ing varying treatment of publicity claims).
168. See Citizen Media Law Project, supra note 150 (discussing lack of protec-
tion to social networks when faced with right of publicity claims). "A plaintiff that
sues [another] for interfering with [the right of publicity] generally must show
that [the defendant] used (the plaintiffs] name or likeness for a commercial pur-
pose." Id. (emphasis omitted). An individual "can be liable even without creating
a false sense that the person in question endorses [that individual's] product or
service; the key is that [that individual is] exploiting the plaintiffs identity to drive
traffic or obtain some other commercial benefit." Id.
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case would proceed. 169 Even so, the standard is convoluted and a
remedy may remain illusory on these types of claims. 170 Several
cases have required that the plaintiff must suffer an economic harm
in addition to a showing of the defendant's commercial benefit.171
Nevertheless, once clear of the immunity hurdle, it is uncertain
whether a court will find in La Russa's favor, or if his claim will be
caught on the warning track.172
2. Can't Tweet This (Claims for Trademark Infringement/Dilution)
Trademark infringement is "the unauthorized use of a trade-
mark - or of a confusingly similar name, word, symbol, or any com-
bination of these - in connection with the same or related goods or
services and in a manner that is likely to cause confusion, decep-
tion, or mistake about the source of the goods or services."' 73 In his
complaint, La Russa states his name is the infringed trademark. 174
Further, he claims that the unauthorized use of his name by a Twit-
ter member constitutes an infringement of his mark.175 The com-
plaint also spells out that Twitter's "use of [La Russa's] mark both
in the Site's domain name and on the Site itself is misleading and
likely to confuse users by leading them to believe that this Site is
endorsed and authored by [ ] La Russa." 176
169. But cf. id. (discussing court holdings preventing social networks from
seeking cover under Section 230 immunities).
170. See Coats, supra note 5, at 288-89 (discussing case history that also re-
quired economic harm to plaintiff alleging harm under right of publicity claims).
171. See id. (addressing cases assessing right of publicity claims). "[S]ome
commentators have argued that the right of publicity restricts cultural expression.
Courts deal with this tension by balancing a person's right to earn a living from his
fame against the consequences of restricting another's freedom of expression." Id.
at 288.; see also, Zacchini v. Scripps - Howard Broad., Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-76
(1977) (discussing that television station violated Zacchini's right of publicity by
broadcasting Zacchini's entire human cannonball act, and therefore was not ex-
tended First Amendment protections); C.B.C. Distribution and Mktg., Inc. v. Ma-
jor League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1097 (E.D. Mo.
2006) (reasoning that using player plaintiff's statistics on its fantasy baseball web-
site did not interfere with player plaintiffs ability to financially benefit from play-
ing baseball, therefore protecting defendant under First Amendment expression
freedoms).
172. See McGeveran, supra note 16 (noting weakness of La Russa's case).
173. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 797 (8th ed. 2004).
174. See Complaint, supra note 6 (listing La Russa's various claims against
Twitter).
175. See id. (stating La Russa's claims against Twitter). The complaint states
that "[Twitter, Inc.] owns the registered domain name twitter.com and pursuant
thereto, twitter.com/TonyLaRussa. The Site contains an unauthorized photo-
graph of Plaintiff and written statements impliedly written by [La Russa] himself,
when if fact they are not." Id.
176. Id.
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Although "[d]ozens of cases over the last decade or so have
addressed the question of whether 'using' a third party trademark
on a website constitutes trademark infringement," La Russa's claim
against Twitter is one of the few against a social networking site for
content posted by a third party.177 Remarkably, La Russa attempts
to rework tort rights into an area not protected by the CDA and
potentially not covered under the safe harbor of the DMCA.1 78 If
La Russa had prevailed, this would have created the "possibility of a
loophole for celebrities who can recast ... claims under trademark
law . . . [and] . . . [this may create a] double standard: celebrities
maligned by anonymous online impostors could plead around Sec-
tion 230 [of the CDA] by claiming trademark . . .rights in their
name, while many ordinary people victimized ... would have their
claims blocked." 179 This brings the argument full circle as to
whether Internet media should belong to the same rules as tradi-
tional mediums such as newspapers, and television and radio broad-
casts. 180 Looking back at original defamation in media cases, such
as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held for the
requirement that public officials (and celebrities) prove a higher
standard of defamation, libel, and slander than required by a pri-
vate individual. 181 The rationale is that public officials are more
capable of handling and possibly counteracting this type of
harm. 182 If celebrities, however, continue to hurdle the CDA im-
munities by claiming trademark infringement, then it is the private
individuals who will be left with the higher hurdle: a contradictory
consequence from the original rationale of the Supreme Court. 183
Some dispute exists, however, as to whether La Russa properly
classified his name as a trademark.184 First, "surnames (names of
177. See Hocking, supra note 53, at 197-98 (citing treatment of third party
trademark infringement claims in past cases ).
178. See id. at 196-98 (discussing scope of CDA protection and DMCA safe
harbor).
179. McGeveran, supra note 16.
180. See id. (noting differences between traditional forms of media and In-
ternet media).
181. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring
higher standard of proof of actual malice for public officials than required for
private individuals).
182. See id. at 283-84 (discussing rationale for higher standard of proof for
celebrities and public officials).
183. See McGeveran, supra note 16 (discussing possible consequence if celeb-
rities prevail when restructuring claims from tort claims to trademark infringe-
ment claims).
184. See Balasubramani, supra note 164 (addressing holes in La Russa's suit
against Twitter).
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people) typically are not entitled to trademark protection." 185 Sec-
ond, from the complaint, La Russa does not assert that he has regis-
tered his name as an official trademark.18 6 Finally, putting aside
the issue as to whether La Russa's name is a protected mark, trade-
mark infringement requires not only the mark's use in commerce,
but also likelihood of confusion regarding its use. 187 Arguably, it is
difficult to speculate that because the site page contained the
phrase "Hey There! Tony La Russa is using Twitter," Twitter exper-
ienced a commercial benefit. 88 This is particularly so, considering
the page only had four followers.189 Because the page "hinted" that
the postings were in the spirit of parody, establishing likelihood of
confusion is also difficult. 190 Additionally, a population of four fol-
lowers may not be a large enough to show substantial harm even if
it can be shown that the page had likelihood to cause confusion. 19 1
Therefore, even if La Russa's attorney could convince the court that
the use of Tony La Russa's trademarked name was used in com-
merce, La Russa still needs to produce a curve ball to strike out
Twitter's First Amendment Freedom of Speech rights to parody.19 2
Next, La Russa not only alleges trademark infringement, but
also trademark dilution.' 93 Dilution is "the act or an instance of
185. Id.
186. See id. (noting lack of discovery because La Russa dismissed claim at early
stage). The United States Patent and Trademark Office only has one mark for
"Tony La Russa Baseball" and this mark has since been marked dead as of March
26, 2005. See Trademark Electronic Search System, http://tess2.uspto.gov (follow
"New User Form Search" hyperlink; then search "La Russa") (last visited Mar. 11,
2010) (testing trademark validity). Further, the registering party was not Tony La
Russa, but Stormfront Studios, Inc. See id. (confirming source of trademark).
187. See Balasubramani, supra note 164 (addressing necessary showing by La
Russa to win suit if continued).
188. See id. (stating difficulties La Russa's complaint contained in making
claims of trademark infringement or dilution, and that postings provided Twitter
with commercial benefit).
189. See id. (discussing weakness in La Russa's claim); see also Complaint, supra
note 6 (listing La Russa's claims against Twitter).
190. See McGeveran, supra note 16 ("[P] roving confusion and harm will be
very difficult, since (1) the account only had four followers; (2) it included a nota-
tion in the user's profile section, "Bio Parodies are fun for everyone.").
191. See id. (discussing La Russa's potential difficulties establishing likelihood
of confusion).
192. See id. (" [1t's not clear a statement (even a false one) that LaRussa used
the service can fairly be called an endorsement of the service."); see also Kevin
Fayle, Understanding the Legal Issues for Social Networking Sites and Their Users
http://technology.findlaw.com/articles/00006/010966.html ("The First Amend-
ment and state constitutional free-speech provisions often come into play in these
types of ... suits.").
193. See Complaint, supra note 6 (listing La Russa's complaints against
Twitter).
2010] 599
27
Bluestone: La Russa's Loophole: Trademark Infringement Lawsuits and Social N
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
600 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
diminishing a thing's strength or lessening its value, and in this
case, the thing is a trademark."1 94 La Russa makes this claim be-
cause Twitter allegedly used La Russa's "famous mark" after La
Russa had already become famous, which "creates the likelihood of
dilution of the mark's distinctive value by diminishing the capacity
of the mark to identify and distinguish [La Russa's] goods and ser-
vices." '195 Although "trademark dilution does not require confusion
or monetary harm... La Russa pleaded under federal dilution law,
which allows only injunctive relief - now moot since the profile is
gone - and completely exempts 'noncommercial use' of a trade-
mark."196 Therefore, the dilution claim inevitably was a swing and a
miss.' 9 7
3. Who's Tweet is it Anyway? (Claim for False Designation of Origin)
False Designation of Origin is protected under Title 15, Sec-
tion 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, which also covers trademark in-
fringements. 198 Under this provision, La Russa alleges that, "[a]s a
direct and proximate result of [Twitter's] actions ... [La Russa] has
suffered significant emotional distress, damage to his reputation,
and damages to the goodwill of his mark."199 Again, La Russa's case
is not strong, and he will run into many of the same issues as were
addressed above in his tort claims.20 0 Admittedly, La Russa will
have a difficult time arguing that his claims trump First Amend-
ment rights to comment on trademarks in the spirit of parody or
criticism. 20'
194. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 489 (8th ed. 2004).
195. Complaint, supra note 6 (stating La Russa's basis for claims against
Twitter).
196. McGeveran, supra note 16.
197. See id. (noting that once Twitter removed fake page, claim became moot
issue).
198. See ACPA, supra note 31 (addressing claims under false designation of
origin). The ACPA further states that:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses ... any false designation of origin ... which - is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... shall be
liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damages by such act.
Id.
199. Complaint, supra note 6.
200. See Balasubramani, supra note 164 (noting weakness of La Russa's case
against Twitter and improbability of success on his claims of tortuous nature, even
when covered under trademark law).
201. See id. ("[T]he account obviously stated that it was a parody account, so
La Russa doesn't look reasonable arguing that people were really fooled into
thinking he endorsed it.").
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4. Tweet-napped (Claim of Cybersquatting)
As noted above, cybersquatting is "the act of reserving a do-
main name on the Internet... and then seeking to profit by selling
or licensing the name to the company that has an interest in being
identified with it."202 La Russa has alleged in his claim of cyber-
squatting that Twitter's actions, "constitute a bad faith intent to
profit from and injure [La Russa's] mark, [are] intended to in-
crease traffic to [Twitter's] site, or were done with knowledge that
injury to [La Russa's] mark was substantially certain to occur. '" 20 3
Because La Russa brought his suit in the United States court system,
he is relying on the ACPA, and not UDRP rules. 20 4 As discussed
earlier, few cases have determined whether the "post-domain" term
(or mark) used is covered by the ACPA .205 Therefore, based on
past case law, predating the social network boom, La Russa has a
difficult, though not insurmountable, argument to make.20 6 Fur-
ther, even if a court considers the use of a trademark in a post-
domain path as possible infringement, La Russa's case to prove like-
lihood of confusion, as stated above, is still lacking. 20 7 Establishing
the necessary elements for La Russa's claims will be difficult
because:
(1) The account only had four followers; (2) it included a nota-
tion in the user's profile section, 'Bio Parodies are fun for every-
one;' [and] (3) it's not clear a statement (even a false one) that La
Russa used the service can fairly be called an endorsement of the
service.208
Perhaps with a different set of facts, a court would be willing to
address the issue in a different light. 20 9
202. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 415 (8th ed. 2004).
203. Complaint, supra note 6.
204. See Balasubramani, supra note 164 ("La Russa's cybersquatting claims are
based in part on a federal statute, commonly known as the ACPA.").
205. For full discussion on known case analysis of post-domain paths, see
supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
206. See generally Cendali & Kehoe, supra note 85, at 113 (remarking on how
new popularity of "vanity URLs" may lead to case law directly readdressing issues of
social networks' use and similar bad faith uses of trademarks as seen in typical
ACPA and UDRP cybersquatting cases).
207. See McGeveran, supra note 16 ("In this particular case, proving confusion
and harm will be very difficult.").
208. Id.
209. See Schaefer, supra note 140 ("Each ACPA turns on the particular facts
presented.").
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B. Twitter's Reply
Like other social networks, Twitter has an in depth trademark
policy, and following La Russa's suit, the site launched an addi-
tional protection option for trademark holders.210 First, Twitter of-
fers a general protection to intellectual property holders through
its policy. 211 The policy not only addresses "name squatting" issues,
but also addresses impersonation issues, its copyright policy, and
the procedures the site uses to comply with the DMCA "take down
notice" requirements. 2 12 Next, the terms of service forbid any use
of trademark material for financial gain that may mislead or con-
fuse others. 213
Twitter's policy now reads:
Twitter pledges to immediately suspend accounts with
clear intent to mislead others, even if there is no trade-
mark infringement. *** If the owner shows that the in-
fringer had a clear intent to mislead people into believing
a user account is affiliated with a particular company, Twit-
ter will permanently suspend the infringer's account.2
14
Finally, Twitter promises that after mark owners report trade-
mark violations, through Twitter's website support page, they will
respond to the report within twenty-four hours. 215 Despite requir-
210. See Lisa Greenwald-Swire & Matthew L. Levine, Cost - Effective Enforcement
Strategies For a Challenging Economy, 984 PLI/PAT 707, 716-17 (2009) (describing
Twitter's trademark policy); see also Blog posted by Biz, Not Playing Ball, Twitter
blog, June 6, 2009, available at http://blog.twitter.com/2009/06/not-playing-
ball.html (remarking on La Russa's lawsuit against Twitter and recognition by net-
work providers for "an opportunity to improve Twitter user experience and clear
up confusion beyond simply removing impersonation accounts once alerted"
through launching "Verified Accounts Beta"); Maury Brown, In Wake of La Russa
Suit, Twitter Set to Role Out Verification System, June 18, 2009, http://www.bizofbase-
ball.com/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=3344:in-wake-of-la-
russa-suit-twitter-set-to-role-out-verification-system&catid=6:internet&ltemid= 25
("Twitter is in the midst of Beta testing a verification system in an effort to thwart
fake Twitter profiles. The addition of the system comes in the wake of a suit by...
Tony La Russa.").
211. See Greenwald-Swire, supra note 210, at 716-17 (describing Twitter's
trademark policy).
212. Twitter Support:: Impersonation, Trademark, and Terms of Service Poli-
cies, http://twitter.zendesk.com/forums/26257/entries (last visited Oct. 4, 2009)
(providing list of links addressing Twitter's policy on different issues including im-
personation, trademark infringements, and other terms of service).
213. See Twitter Trademark Policy, supra note 8 ("Using accompany or busi-
ness name, logo, or other trademark protected materials in a manner that may
mislead or confuse others or be used for financial gain may be considered trade-
mark infringement.").
214. Greenwald-Swire, supra note 210, at 717.
215. See id. at 716-17 (discussing Twitter's trademark policy).
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ing more formality, Twitter's take on copyright infringement fol-
lows the same line as its policy with trademark infringement.2 1 6
Second, Twitter has added an optional protection measure,
still in testing stages, called a "verified account."217 This new system
places a "verified account badge" on a site page after Twitter has
contacted the registering person or entity and has proven that the
account belongs to that person or entity.2 18 The badge will allow
Twitter members to "easily see which accounts... are authentic."
2 19
So far, Twitter is only verifying a select group of celebrities and ex-
tremely well known accounts that "have had problems with imper-
sonation or identity confusion" but has not yet branched out the
verification to businesses.220 Through both policies, Twitter has fol-
lowed the leads of other social networks by incorporating protec-
tions into its terms of service. 221
IV. CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD - ARE SOCIAL NETWORKS
"TWEETERING" ON THE EDGE?
As shown through judicial history, social networks have been
afforded considerable protection on many occasions.222 Interest-
ingly, courts have accepted, and even encouraged, high levels of
self-regulation because of these expanded protections. 223 As noted
earlier, however, there may still be a loophole to establish liability
on social networks when approached with cases of trademark in-
216. See Twitter Support :: Filing a Copyright Complaint or DMCA Take
Down Notice, http://twitter.zendesk.com/forums/26257/entries/15795 (last vis-
ited Oct. 4, 2009) (requiring procedures including filing complaint electronically
via email as well as physical filing via fax or mail, and requires formal filing proce-
dures including ticket numbers).
217. Brown, supra note 210.
218. See Twitter.com, Verified Account, http://twitter.com/help/verfified
(last visited Oct. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Twitter Verified Account] (discussing point
of new verified account badges).
219. Id. Twitter maintains, "This ... does not mean that accounts without the
'Verified Account' badge are fake. The vast majority of accounts on the system are
not impersonators, and we don't have the ability to check 100% of them." Id.
220. Id. Although Twitter has not begun using this feature for businesses, the
site is open to the requests to possibly expanding the 'Verified Badge' to those
businesses seeking protection. See id. (discussing Verified Badge expansion).
221. Compare Twitter.com, Twitter/Terms of Service, http://twitter.com/tos
(last visited Oct. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Twitter TOS] (providing all terms of service
related to use of Twitter by users), with Facebook TOS, supra note 125 (enumerat-
ing all terms of service relating to use of Facebook by users).
222. For a further discussion of social network protections, see supra notes 67-
83 and accompanying text.
223. See Horton, supra note 31, at 1305 ("IT]he CDA's purpose is to promote
self-help on the Internet and prevent the potential chilling effect that regulation
may have on Internet speech.").
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fringement.224 This loophole has grave implications of counter-act-
ing age-old rationales of law defining cases.2 25 Therefore, future
court outcomes on these types of cases have great potential to cre-
ate less ambiguity surrounding legal Internet use and liability. 226
Finally, courts may take a similar stance on trademarks in post-
domain paths as they did when affording protections to social net-
works. 227 The same courts that decided to relieve social networks
from liability, because of the "chilling effect" on First Amendment
freedom of speech rights on the Internet, may take the same view
when assessing liability under the ACPA and UDRP concerning
post-domain paths containing trademarks.228
fillian Bluestone*
224. For a further discussion of social network liability, see supra text and ac-
companying note 57.
225. For a further discussion of social network loopholes, see supra text and
accompanying notes 180-183.
226. For a further discussion of unchartered legal issues on internet use, see
supra text and accompanying note 41.
227. See id. (discussing court rationale for allowing immunities to social
networks).
228. For a further discussion of social networks and broad liability relief, see
supra text and accompanying note 70.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Villanova University School of Law; B.S. Univer-
sity of Maryland Robert H. Smith School of Business, May 2008.
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